Part 2- Thoughts on Aftermath of Syrian Coup

In the previous post of this series, I wrote about the acquisition and testing of nuclear weapons by Iran will almost certainly be the most important medium- to long-term effect of the recent Syrian coup. While some readers might want to believe than the situation in Iran is somehow unstable and likely to lead to regime change, the reality is that such an outcome was far more likely between 2008-2012 than today. But why was it far more likely then than now. The simple answer is hope, specifically many more younger Iranians were dumb enough in past to believe that normalization of relations with USA and West was possible and desirable. That is why all those “reformers” had traction in Iranian politics between the late-2000s and mid-2010s. However once the JCPOA was signed, it became obvious to anybody with a functional brain that USA and West had no intent of normalizing relations with Iran. Furthermore, the early 2010s is also the point when the center of global trade and industrial capability firmly shifted towards Asia in general and China in particular.

At this point, anybody who is not a brain-washed moron can clearly see that future of global trade, growth and technological progress lies in the East and Western countries are a spent, tired and demographically bankrupt force without a hopeful future. While some in the West see the recently elected Pezeshkian-Zarif led “reformist” government as another chance at a color revolution in Iran, the reality is that public support for them is far weaker than a decade ago. I am also not going to speculate on the plausible theory that Raisi’s death in a helicopter crash (in 2024) was the result of internal power struggle among the “reformists” and nationalists. In any case, thus far the Pezeshkian-Zarif administration has demonstrated a pretty high level of incompetence. Some might see that as deliberate, but I see it as more real than intentional. While I have no doubt that there is a real constituency in the Iranian government which is either dumb or greedy enough surrender to the rapidly declining West for personal gains, the stupid behavior of successive American administrations in past decade have made that outcome basically impossible- as most of the Iranian ‘deep state’ no longer sees a viable path for reconciliation with USA- which allows them to keep their power.

With that out of the way, let us move on the next two major downstream effects of recent Syrian coup, starting with the future of Syria as a unified nation-state.

2] As mentioned in an earlier post, the modern state of Syria has always been a highly unstable entity, ever since its creation after end of WW1. It is just not possible to put 3-5 very clannish ethnic groups who have never gotten along in a modern nation state and expect it work- unless the ruler is some sort of secular dictator. That task become even harder if a neighboring country, such as Turkey, is trying to use existing ethnic divisions in said country to “reclaim” some of its old territory- at same time another one (USA) is siding with yet another group. Long story short, Syria is very unlikely to have a stable democratically elected government in the foreseeable future. At this stage, the slow-motion splitting of Syria into 3-4 parts (each dominated by one ethnic group) is the least awful option. However, given all the foreign parties stirring this cauldron, it is far more likely that next few months will see a restart of Syrian civil war.

Whether the sequel will be as bloody as the original remains to be seen, but at this point it is almost inevitable that the civil war will restart soon. We cannot forget that the Kurds in northern Iraq rule an almost autonomous region in that country and will likely support their co-ethnics in neighboring Syria to achieve the same. It is, also, a foregone conclusion that USA will support such a movement because it wants to humiliate the current administration in Tukey. There is also a very real chance that Russia and Iran might funnel a lot of weapons to armed groups opposing the current ISIS-derived Sunni administration in Syria as vengeance on the cheap. While it is hard to predict whether the sequel will cause another wave of migration to Europe, that outcome is more likely than not. There is also the question of what happens when Turkey ends up sharing a border with Israel. While the administration in Tukey has good relations with Israel, the majority of its population have no love for Israel- to put it mildly. To summarize, the drama over Syria is not even close to over.

3] Let us now talk about Russia’s reaction, but before we go there let us be clear about one thing- Russia is not USSR. This is important to understand since the heaviest support and armed assistance for Syria occurred during the time of USSR. While Russia is, indeed, the successor to USSR- it has a different set of goals and priorities from its predecessor. This is a fancy way of saying that much of Russian assistance to Syria after 1991 was about maintaining a legacy, but no longer important, relationship. While we can certainly disagree of whether this was the right position or a strategic mistake- it was their decision. The point to remember is that Russian bases in Syria were no longer as relevant to Russia as they were for USSR during the Cold War. Did the much diminished support for Syria also have something to do with Putin wanting to improve relations with Turkey and Israel- likely. Was this decision a mistake in retrospective- probably. Will it come to bite him in the behind- seems like it.

Hence, it is important to realize that the relationship between Russia and Syria was never as strong as during the Cold War- and both parties were responsible. Having said that, the maneuvering and armed support by Turkey to push out the Assad government is a betrayal of the informal arrangement between Russia and Turkey- even if it is predictable. More importantly, Russia cannot afford to let this slide and act as if nothing occurred. It is therefore very likely that Russia will start supplying armed groups fighting against the current Turkey-backed regime in Syria. Getting that country embroiled in a costly civil war on its eastern and southern border would be payback for Turkey’s abrogation of its unofficial arrangement with Russia. This is another reason why the Syrian civil war is going to get a costly sequel- even if majority in that country don’t want it. Depending on feedback to this post, or some major events in that country, I might write a third part to this series- but don’t expect it.

What do you think? Comments?